Donald Boyd v. Administrator New Jersey State by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-20-2020 
Donald Boyd v. Administrator New Jersey State 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Donald Boyd v. Administrator New Jersey State" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 796. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/796 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 





UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  




DONALD E. BOYD, 
   Appellant 
v.  
ADMINISTRATOR NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY  
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00965) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on May 19, 2020 
Before: McKEE, BIBAS, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 




BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
On habeas review of a state conviction, a federal court’s role is limited. When a state 
court reasonably finds facts and applies clearly established federal law, we must defer. 
 




Donald Boyd decided to represent himself at his criminal trial for kidnapping and rape. 
It did not go well, and the jury convicted him. He now attacks that conviction on habeas, 
arguing that the State denied him due process and his right to counsel when it involuntarily 
drugged him with Xanax starting on the third day of trial. 
But as the state court reasonably found, Boyd knew all along that he was taking Xanax 
for his anxiety and did not object to it. Indeed, he demanded that drug by name, heard the 
nurse announce that she was giving it to him, and said he felt better after he took it. So 
although Supreme Court precedent requires courts to make certain findings before letting 
the government involuntarily medicate a defendant, Boyd had no right to that process. And 
no clearly established federal law required the state court to reevaluate Boyd’s waiver of 
his right to counsel after he started taking Xanax. So we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of his habeas petition.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The crime 
Pretending to be an expected visitor, Donald Boyd tricked a woman into letting him 
into her apartment. State v. Boyd, No. 04-06-1142, 2008 WL 3287240, at *2 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Aug. 12, 2008) (per curiam). Once inside, Boyd attacked her from behind. 
Id. He then bound her arms and legs to the bed, threatening her with a knife and gun. Id. 
As she resisted, he gagged her and raped her both vaginally and anally. Id. 
A year and a half later, DNA tests identified the semen found on the victim as coming 
from Boyd. See id. As a forensic scientist testified, the odds that the DNA could have come 
from anyone else were several quadrillion to one. Id. 
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B. Boyd’s trial 
The State of New Jersey charged Boyd with aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping, 
burglary, and terroristic threats. Before trial, Boyd moved to fire his lawyer. Though the 
court warned him of the dangers of self-representation, Boyd still chose to represent him-
self. At the hearing, Boyd noted that he takes pain medication but not psychotropic drugs. 
Finding that his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, the trial court granted his 
motion but ordered his lawyer to stay on as standby counsel.  
The trial did not go smoothly. For the first three days, Boyd kept protesting that the jail 
had not given him his medications. The first morning, he told the judge that he had not 
eaten breakfast or slept in thirty hours because he had gotten into a quarrel in jail. He also 
said that he needed Clonidine (for high blood pressure), Ultram and Pheldene (for pain), 
and Zantac (for stomach ulcers), but the jail had not given him these medications. Later 
that morning, Boyd took all but the Zantac, which would have to wait until he met with the 
jail doctor. 
That afternoon, the court noted on the record that in another trial, Boyd had made the 
same allegations. There too, Boyd said he had gotten into a quarrel at the jail, had not had 
his blood-pressure medicine, and had neither eaten nor slept in thirty hours. State v. Boyd, 
No. 01-12-3098, 2006 WL 1096622, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 27, 2006)  
(per curiam). 
The second day, Boyd again complained that he had gotten only his blood-pressure 
medication. He told the judge that he takes painkillers and anxiety medication and that he 
was “shaking” without them. JA 8, 271. The trial transcript shows that he specifically 
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named “Xanax.” JA 271. But because the jail doctor had decided that he did not need them, 
the trial moved ahead. 
On the third day of trial, Boyd said he could not keep representing himself until he got 
his other medications. Though he told the court that he was “shaking,” the court did not 
believe him. JA 276. The court noted that Boyd was not shaking, slurring, or stuttering; 
instead, he looked “as solid and secure as everyone else in the courtroom.” JA 279. Still, 
the court called the jail doctor to see about getting Boyd his other medications. 
When the jail nurse arrived later that morning, she said on the record and in Boyd’s 
presence that she had brought “Xanax, one milligram, and Ultram, fifty grams.” JA 278. 
Boyd then drank the medicine dissolved in a glass of juice. An officer confirmed that he 
would keep getting those medications twice a day for the rest of the trial. 
After a long weekend, the trial resumed with closing arguments. When Boyd stood up 
to give his argument, he faced the jury and said something like: “My name is Donald Boyd. 
Do you want to see a man bleed? I’ll show you blood.” JA 285. He then took out a hidden 
razor blade and cut his arm. Boyd later admitted that he had “planned [the incident], maybe 
to hurt himself, [or] maybe to get a mistrial.” JA 22. 
On the last morning of trial, Boyd showed up to court in his prison jumpsuit. The cut 
on his arm did not need stitches, nor was he wearing a bandage. When asked why he was 
not dressed for trial, he said he had just learned that the jail was giving him Xanax, not 
Zantac. He alleged that he had never taken Xanax in his life and that the high dosage made 
him “crazy.” JA 282. When the court asked again why he was not dressed for trial, he said, 
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“[i]t doesn’t matter any more.” JA 282. Later, he added: “Of course I’m going to be found 
guilty in front of this jury. This was a lynching.” JA 285. 
The jury did indeed convict Boyd of all fifteen charges, and the court sentenced him to 
life imprisonment plus sixty years. The state appellate court affirmed. 2008 WL 3287240. 
The New Jersey and U.S. Supreme Courts denied review. 960 A.2d 745 (N.J. 2008); 556 
U.S. 1241 (2009) (mem.).  
C. State habeas  
In his state post-conviction petition, Boyd claimed that he did not know he had been 
given Xanax for part of the trial. The trial court denied his petition, finding that his claim 
conflicted with his statements at trial that he took anxiety medication. The New Jersey 
appellate court affirmed. It distinguished Riggins v. Nevada, which provides constitutional 
safeguards when the government seeks to medicate a defendant at trial involuntarily. 504 
U.S. 127, 135 (1992). Here, by contrast, the nurse had announced the drug on the record, 
so Boyd “knew he was being given Xanax from the beginning of the trial” yet never ob-
jected. JA 32. The court also noted that Riggins involved an anti-psychotic rather than an 
anti-anxiety drug.  In any event, it found no prejudice because there were no signs that the 
Xanax left Boyd “intoxicated, or cognitively impaired.” JA 34. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court denied review.  
D. Federal habeas 
Boyd raised the same claim again on federal habeas. The District Court denied his pe-
tition. It deferred to the state court’s finding that Boyd knew he was taking Xanax. And it 
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recognized that Riggins is limited to “forced and involuntary” medication. JA 88 (citing 
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–81 (2003)).  
The District Court also rejected Boyd’s claim that he had a right to a second hearing on 
self-representation. Boyd argued that taking Xanax after he had decided to proceed pro se 
impaired his understanding of the risks of representing himself. But, the court noted, he 
offered no support for that assertion apart from “after the fact speculation.” JA 91. We 
issued a certificate of appealability. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), and we have jurisdiction 
under §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We cannot grant federal habeas relief unless the state court’s 
decision rested on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” based on the evidence be-
fore it or its decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” § 2254(d)(1)–(2). Because 
the District Court held no evidentiary hearing, we review its decision de novo. Robinson v. 
Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 2014).  
II. THE STATE COURT REASONABLY FOUND THAT BOYD RECEIVED DUE PROCESS  
Boyd first claims that the State denied him due process by “unknowingly and involun-
tarily drugg[ing]” him with high doses of Xanax at trial. Appellant’s Br. 16. The state ha-
beas court, he argues, unreasonably applied Riggins and Sell. Not so. 
Though Riggins and Sell require courts to make certain findings before the government 
can involuntarily medicate a defendant on trial, they do not extend those procedural safe-
guards to defendants who are not forced to accept medication. 504 U.S. at 133; 539 U.S. 
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at 179. Here, the state court reasonably found that Boyd knew the jail was giving him 
Xanax and did not refuse it. So its decision reasonably applied those precedents.  
A. The state court’s finding that Boyd knew he was taking Xanax was 
reasonable 
The state court found that Boyd knew the jail was giving him Xanax and did not object. 
On federal habeas, we presume the state court’s factual finding was correct. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(1). As petitioner, Boyd bears the burden of rebutting this presumption of correct-
ness by clear and convincing evidence. Id. He has not met that heavy burden. 
Boyd claims that he did not know he was taking Xanax. But that claim conflicts with 
the record. On the third day of trial, the jail nurse announced the name of the drug 
(“Xanax”) and the dosage (“one milligram”) on the record in Boyd’s presence before giv-
ing it to him. JA 278.  
Boyd responds that he never heard the nurse say “Xanax.” Rather, he says he heard 
“Zantac,” the ulcer medication that he had asked for. But this is unlikely. On the first day 
of trial, Boyd complained about not getting his anxiety medication. He told the court: “I 
take anxiety medication and my blood pressure medication together with painkillers. Not 
to have them I’m shaking right now.” JA 8 (emphasis added). He also explained: “This 
morning, they gave me my blood pressure medication, no Ultum [sic]. The Xanax is for my 
ulcers. Because I have anxiety. I don’t have any of that. I’ve been on it, taking it regularly 
now for over a year. You take a person off of it like that at their discretion, I’m just very 
shaky.” JA 271 (emphasis added).  
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Plus, Boyd heard the nurse say “one milligram” of Xanax. JA 278. That makes it un-
likely that he thought he was taking Zantac. On the first day of trial, he told the court that 
he takes one hundred and fifty milligrams of Zantac twice a day. He was articulate and 
persistent in demanding the particular medications he needed. Though Xanax and Zantac 
sound alike, Boyd did not object to hearing a dose that would have been 1/150 of his usual 
Zantac dose. 
Based on the evidence before it, the state court could have reasonably found that he 
knew he was taking Xanax, an anxiety medication, not Zantac, an ulcer medication. And 
the record does not show, nor does Boyd claim, that he objected. Thus, Boyd cannot show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the state court’s findings were wrong. 
B. Because Boyd knew he was taking Xanax and did not object, the state court 
did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent  
Boyd argues that the state habeas court unreasonably applied Riggins and Sell. He 
claims that he was denied the procedural safeguards guaranteed by those cases. But Boyd 
had no right to those protections because both cases limit only involuntary medication. 
The facts of Riggins and Sell are largely the same. In each case, the trial court rejected 
a defendant’s objection to having to take antipsychotic drugs during trial. 504 U.S. at 129–
31; 539 U.S. at 173–74. In each case, the Supreme Court recognized defendants’ “consti-
tutionally protected ‘liberty interest’ in ‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs.’ ” Sell, 539 U.S. at 178 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 
(1990)); accord Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133–34. So before the Government can force a de-
fendant to take those drugs, it must find that the treatment is (1) “medically appropriate,” 
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(2) “substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial,” 
and (3) necessary (given the alternatives) to promote important governmental interests re-
lating to the trial. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; accord Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. These cases man-
dated these safeguards for defendants who are “treated involuntarily” or “forced” to take 
the medication. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135; accord Sell, 539 U.S. at 179. 
Boyd tries to stretch involuntariness to include lack of informed consent. But Riggins 
and Sell do not say that. On federal habeas, we cannot extend the definition of involuntar-
iness to reach lack of informed consent. The habeas statute neither “require[s] state courts 
to extend [Supreme Court] precedent [n]or license[s] federal courts to treat the failure to 
do so as error.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014) (emphasis omitted). 
Boyd knew he was taking Xanax, and he did not object. No one forced him to take it. 
So this is not a case of involuntary medication, and the state court correctly set Riggins 
aside. That is enough to support the court’s decision. We need not decide whether the state 
court erred by distinguishing Riggins based on the type of drug given, or by considering 
actual prejudice. 
III. THE STATE COURT REASONABLY FOUND NO SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION  
Boyd also argues that the State violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by drug-
ging him with high doses of Xanax after he decided to proceed pro se. This claim fails too. 
No clearly established federal law guaranteed him a second Faretta hearing, after he started 
taking Xanax, to reevaluate his decision to represent himself. 
Though the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to represent himself, he 
must choose to do so “with eyes open.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) 
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(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). The court 
must first warn him of the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” so the record 
reflects a knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. 
Boyd now argues that once he started taking Xanax, the state court should have held a 
second Faretta hearing. To be sure, Boyd did say at the hearing that he was not taking any 
psychotropic drugs. But while he was taking Xanax on the third and fourth days of trial, he 
never said that he felt sick or unable to represent himself. Only on the fifth day, after he 
claimed that he learned he was taking it, did he say it made him “crazy.” JA 282. 
This silence is telling. Given his repeated pleas for medication, the state court could 
have reasonably expected him to speak up if he felt unwell. But just the opposite happened: 
once the medicine “kick[ed] in,” he told the court he was “definitely feeling a little better 
and a little bit level headed and a little bit more clear.” JA 280. “That medication is essential 
for me,” he added. Id. He also said he “d[id]n’t have the shakes anymore.” JA 280. And 
though Boyd cut his arm in front of the jury during his closing statement, he admitted that 
he had planned that in part “maybe to get a mistrial.” JA 22.  
Boyd does not cite, nor can we find, any clearly established federal law that requires a 
second Faretta hearing in these circumstances. So the state habeas court properly denied 
relief. We express no opinion on whether there could be some intervening circumstance 
that might require a court to reevaluate a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel.  
* * * * * 
On federal habeas, we must defer to the state court’s reasonable findings of fact and 
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The state court reasonably 
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found that Boyd knew he was taking Xanax and did not object to it. So it reasonably dis-
tinguished this case from Riggins and Sell, which prescribe procedures before the Govern-
ment can medicate a defendant involuntarily. And no clearly established federal law re-
quired the state court to hold a second Faretta hearing, after Boyd started taking Xanax, to 
reevaluate his waiver of his right to counsel. Because the District Court correctly rejected 
these claims, we will affirm.  
